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On 10 December 2020, the European Council adopted conclusions regarding the
draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime
of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (“Conditionality Regulation”
hereinafter). Rather than a ringing declaration reaffirming the importance of the rule
of law for the EU, the EUCO Conclusions undermine the rule of law on all fronts.
The EUCO Conclusions are formally non-binding, the outcome of a “compromise”
brokered by the German presidency of the Council with the governments of
Hungary and Poland. But they are clearly intended to cast a long shadow over the
Conditionality Regulation to make it practically unusable. Both Hungary and Poland
are currently subject to protracted Article 7 proceedings before the Council in order
to determine the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Polish authorities of
the rule of law (referred to the Council by the Commission in 2017) and a clear risk
of a serious breach by Hungarian authorities of many of the EU’s foundational values
(referred to the Council by the Parliament in 2018). These procedures have been
stuck in the Council while the German presidency has done little to help enforce the
rule of law in either Member State. Instead, the German presidency chose to ignore
the substantial evidence that Hungary and Poland threaten basic European values
and gave them what they wanted in this “compromise” so that they would not hold
the EU budget and Recovery Fund hostage to their rule-of-law-violating demands.
Hostage-taking is punished in most jurisdictions, but evidently not in the EU. In the
EU, it gets rewarded even if it means breaching the EU Treaties to appease those
breaching the same Treaties at home.
When the hostage threat emerged, the German Chancellor emphasized the
need for “all sides” to make compromises. One might find that stance surprising
considering that she previously said, “It is important that we defend the rule of
law, which is one of our goals during the German Presidency.” The agreement
that the German presidency brokered started from the premise that democracies
should compromise with autocracies, which is akin to saying law-abiding citizens
must make compromises with criminals. Moreover, the EUCO Conclusions award
a great victory to Orbán and Kaczy#ski, which can now look forward to years of
non-enforcement and only weak, too-little-too-late enforcement after that. Whether
the EUCO Conclusions are treated as legally binding by other EU institutions, in
breach of the Treaties, or just informally influence enforcement of the Conditionality
Regulation, which we argue they should not, European leaders will have allowed
Orbán and Kaczy#ski to further water down the mechanism meant to bring an end
to their ongoing and close-to-be-completed destruction of all internal checks on their
power, and in the case of Hungary’s “mafia state”, industrial-scale corruption and
personal enrichment thanks to EU funds.
- 1 -
Some EU leaders may assert that EU money will now be brought under the rule of
law given that the Conditionality Regulation is now guaranteed to pass. But they are
wrong.
1. This is not a victory for the Rule of Law
The purpose of the Conditionality Regulation as originally proposed was to condition
the distribution of EU money on compliance with the rule of law so that EU money
no longer funded national autocrats. Orbán’s Hungary and Kaczy#ski’s Poland
have been included by democracy experts in a group of 10 countries that have
engaged in the most severe democratic backsliding in the past ten years. Freedom
House now considers Hungary no longer a democracy but the EU’s first “hybrid”
or quasi-authoritarian regime. Poland’s rankings in global indices have also fallen
fast so that Poland is now considered only a “semi-consolidated democracy”. EU
money has paid for much of this destruction, and the Conditionality Regulation
originally grew out of a sense that this flow of funds should be stopped. But the
form of the Conditionality Regulation as it has emerged through the law-making
process is a shrunken version of its previous self – hard to trigger, limited in what it
can reach, with the rule of law not even included in its title anymore due to another
“compromise” we owe to the German presidency. Moreover, its implementation,
“thanks” to the EUCO Conclusions, will be delayed.
Over the ten years that the rule of law problem has been festering in the EU, EU
institutions should have learned that time is absolutely of the essence and that
only prompt action is effective. And yet, the EUCO Conclusions aim to build in yet
another postponement before the Conditionality Regulation can be used because
they state, with the von der Leyen Commission’s collusion, that the Regulation shall
not be enforced before the European Court of Justice issues a ruling on its legality
and not before a complex consultation process with the Member States produces
“guidelines” that will make clear how the mechanism will be used.
Delay constitutes appeasement because it permits Orbán and Kaczy#ski to further
entrench the destruction of the rule of law in ways that make reversal more difficult if
not virtually impossible. This bodes ill for protecting the rule of law.
But perhaps protecting the rule of law is no longer the point. The Conditionality
Regulation was once designed primarily for that purpose but now appears primarily
designed to protect the budget because it can only be triggered when funds have
already been misspent. That was already hardwired into the earlier compromises
which even took “the rule of law” out of the title of the Regulation. Under the EUCO
Conclusions, however, the supposedly independent Guardian of the Treaties is
instructed to delay enforcing the weakened the Conditionality Regulation. A delay
in implementing the Regulation will mean that most of the funds this Regulation is
supposed to protect will already have been committed while the Regulation awaits its
debut.
The Recovery “Next Gen” Fund is designed to be spent quickly. It is supposed to
allow EU Member States, hard hit by the Covid-19 virus, to mitigate the effects of
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the shutdowns and economic dislocations that have resulted from the pandemic.
As a result, national allocations are very probably to be spent precisely during the
two years it will likely take for the ECJ to review it. Under the European Council
Conclusions, the Commission will be hamstrung from reviewing these budgetary
commitments as they occur.
Moreover, in Hungary, we can expect that the Orbán government will behave in
the new budget cycle the same way it behaved in the last budget cycle. From
2014-2020, the budget strategy of the Hungarian government was “frontloaded
absorption.” The majority of the funds for the entire 2014-2020 cycle were already
committed by Spring 2018, when the national parliamentary election was held.
Given that the next Hungarian national election is scheduled for spring 2022, we can
expect the funds allocated in this new budget cycle to also be committed before the
election, which itself will almost surely be before the ECJ has cleared the Regulation
for use.
Of course, if the Regulation takes effect on 1 January 2021, then the Commission
can go back and retroactively look at how the money was spent, once it is given the
green light to do so. But the Regulation itself says that while the Member State may
be docked funds for violating the rule of law, the final recipients of the money should
not be the ones to suffer. As the Regulation states in Article 5(5): “the Commission
shall do its utmost to ensure that any amount due from government entities or
Member States in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article [implementing the
withholding of funds] is effectively paid to final recipients or beneficiaries…”
Suppose a corrupt government inside the EU awards contracts to its friends using
EU money and does so quickly while the ECJ has the Regulation under review. The
EU will still guarantee that the friends are paid, even after it finds that the money
has been corruptly spent. This is not such a hypothetical case. As the Corruption
Research Center Budapest showed in its analysis of 248,404 Hungarian public
tenders from 2005 through 2020, “The share of public procurements won by crony
companies . . . has increased significantly since 2011.” Moreover the problem of
corruption seemed to be even worse in EU-funded contracts than in contracts with
purely domestic sources. If Viktor Orbán repeats during the new budget cycle what
he did during the last one, then he will award his friends the lion’s share of the
EU-funded public contracts in the next year and a half before the election. If the
Commission is authorized to spring into action only two years from now, after both
the recovery and budget funds have largely been committed, the Commission may
well find that EU funds have been corruptly spent. But as the Regulation is currently
written, the EU will still have to ensure that Orbán’s friends are paid. Well done to the
German presidency!
No wonder Viktor Orbán immediately published a video on his Facebook page on
the day that the EUCO Conclusions passed, bragging about the champagne that
awaited him after the vote. After all, he knows better than anyone that rule of law
delayed is rule of law destroyed.
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2. The EUCO Conclusions systematically undermine
the Conditionality Regulation
The (unlawful) delay in enforcement of the Regulation limits its effects in time and
in fact makes it ridiculously easy for any corrupt government simply to favour its
friends without limits. But the EUCO Conclusions also blunt the effects and limit
the potential of this Regulation in other ways while they also cast doubt on other
mechanisms for controlling rogue states in the EU. Let’s review the entire content
of this “compromise” whose compatibility with the EU Treaties and justiciability
will only be briefly examined in the next section as both issues have already been
compellingly analysed by Alemanno and Chamon and Dimitrovs.
The EUCO Conclusions begin in point 1 with a legally inaccurate statement by
suggesting that only Article 7 TEU may be used to “address the breaches of the
Union’s values under Article 2 TEU”. In addition to embarrassingly misrepresenting
the text of Article 7 TEU which does not concern mere breaches of Article 2 TEU but
rather aims to address “a clear risk of a serious breach … of the values referred in
Article 2 (Article 7(1) TEU) and “the existence of a serious and persistent breach”
of Article 2 values (Article 7(2) TEU), this statement contradicts what the European
Court of Justice has already settled in finding that the attempted purge of Poland’s
Supreme Court was a violation of the rule of law under Article 2 TEU, concretised
by Article 19 TEU. Article 2 TEU, as a result, can clearly be the subject of an
infringement action. In addition, the Council has already accepted the fact that the
Commission’s pre-Article 7 framework can be used to prevent and/or accumulate
evidence of breaches of Article 2 values prior to invoking Article 7 notwithstanding
the now totally discredited opinion of the Council Legal Service claiming otherwise
in 2014. The EUCO Conclusions don’t just blunt the effects of the Conditionality
Regulation but they cast aspersions on anything the other institutions can do and
have done to enforce Article 2 values. One may note in passing that the EUCO
does not seem aware of the EEA financial mechanism which provides that all
programmes and activities funded by it for the period 2014-2021 “shall be based
on the common values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,
the rule of law and the respect for human rights including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities”. This provides a basis for suspending funds to EEA recipient
not complying with those values, including the rule of law. In other words, an
external agreement like the EEA, which is an integral part of EU law, is yet another
mechanism to address the breaches of the Union’s values notwithstanding what the
EUCO conclusions claim.
While less harmful, point 2 of the EUCO Conclusions, by emphasising that the
Regulation “is to be applied in full respect of Article 4(2) TEU” gives an unfortunate
veneer of credibility to the fallacious claim of just two governments out of 27 that
dismantling checks and balances can be justified in the name of their alleged
“constitutional identity”. Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, in other words, adopts the
perspective of two rogue states and reassures them that their “concerns”, no matter
how unsubstantiated, fallacious and deceitful, will be respected.
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Point 2 then provides a long list of understandings that the European Council lays
out, as if to instruct other EU institutions in how to understand the Regulation.
Several of these understandings go so far as to orchestrate the order in which
different institutions perform their respective roles and how they should carry out
their responsibilities.
Point 2(a) aims to summarise the primary aim of the Regulation as “the protection of
the Union budget … and the Union’s financial interests” but omits any mention of the
rule of law or Article 2 TEU for that matter.
Point 2(b) embarrassingly states that The Regulation should not be applied
subjectively, unfairly, discriminatorily etc. while making a reader wonder why it is
necessary to say so.
Point 2(c) announces by ventriloquism, that the Commission “intends to develop and
adopt guidelines on the way it will apply the Regulation, including a methodology
for carrying out its assessment.” In fact, there is no such requirement of “guidelines”
in the Regulation itself, so this additional stage in the procedure was cooked
up in a side deal between the European Council aka Angela Merkel and the
Commission aka Angela Merkel’s former Minister of Defence. Furthermore, the
EUCO Conclusions announce that the Commission will devise these guidelines “in
close consultation with the Member States”, without any legal basis and justification
for what amounts to yet another layer of “dialogue” not formally mentioned in the
Regulation itself and, of course, providing yet another opportunity for the rogue
states to delay and derail the enforcement procedure. It also beggars belief that for
the European Council, it is fine not to consult the Parliament for the developments of
these “guidelines”.
But it is in Point 2(c) that the delay we referred to above is embedded. The European
Council announces that the Commission “will not propose measures under the
Regulation” until after a judgment on the merits is adopted by the Court of Justice
“should an action for annulment be introduced with regard to the Regulation” (which
Hungary and Poland have indicated they will lodge). Moreover, there is additional
delay built into the enforcement of Regulation because the newly added guidelines,
to be developed in dialogue with the Member States, should only be finalized
after the Court’s eventual judgment. In short, and in violation of the Treaties, the
European Council is instructing the Guardian of the Treaties not to enforce the
Regulation when it comes into effect until the Regulation has run the gauntlet of an
ECJ judgment and a protracted consultation procedure. Delays appease the rogue
states.
Point 2(d) seems more innocuous as it merely repeats that the Regulation aims to
complement other procedures set out in EU law. But in doing so, it further reinforces
the idea that the only point of the Regulation is “to protect the Union budget …
effectively.” No mention is made of the protection of the rule of law which was the
original point of the whole effort. The EUCO Conclusions here also just directly
contradict the EUCO Conclusions of 21 July 2020.
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Similarly, point 2(e) reflects the German presidency’s repeated attempts to make
the triggering of this mechanism as difficult as possible. The EUCO Conclusions
state that the Regulation requires that “the causal link” between breaches of the
rule of law “and the negative consequences on the Union’s financial interests will
have to be sufficiently direct and be duly established.” But, underlining the suspicion
that the Conditionality Regulation is now not centrally concerned with the rule of
law, this section of the EU Conclusions overtly disowns the whole idea: “The mere
finding that a breach of the rule of law has taken place does not suffice to trigger
the mechanism.” Sadly, this is not incorrect. Indeed, the German presidency has
been able to get the European Parliament to accept the introduction of an extremely
onerous causality test in the Regulation (see use of “sufficiently direct way” in
Article 4 which was apparently borrowed from Joined Cases T99/09 and T308/09).
This probatio diabolica has only been made less “diabolical” by the European
Parliament’s introduction of the notion “serious risk”, i.e., potential negative impact
should suffice to qualify as a breach of the rule of law. Yet, the need to satisfy the
“sufficiently direct way” test remains and only “breaches” rather than generalised
deficiencies can be caught. The EUCO conclusions can however be criticised for
omitting the inconvenient fact that the Regulation is supposed to catch individual
breaches of the principles of the rule of law as well as widespread and/or recurrent
breaches of the rule of law which take the form of recurrent practices, omissions and/
or general measures.
More problematically, Point 2(f) amounts to a rewriting of the Regulation by
stating that the “triggering factors set out in the Regulation are to be read and
applied as a closed list of homogenous elements and not be open to factors or
events of a different nature”. Never mind that triggering conditions listed in Article
4(2) of the Regulation says explicitly that the Regulation may be triggered when
“other situations or conduct of authorities that are relevant to the sound financial
management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the
Union.” The EUCO Conclusions essentially erase that part of the regulation by
proclaiming that what precedes it is a “closed list.” The point about the Regulation
not relating to “generalised deficiencies” is however correct as this is yet another
aspect of the German presidency’s successful watering down of the Commission’s
initial proposal which also initially but no longer refers to the rule of law. One cannot
help but feel like Alice in Wonderland who has been left with the grin without the cat.
Point 2(g) seemingly aims to add that a “thorough dialogue” must occur between
the Member State and the Commission before the Regulation is triggered against a
Member State, even though this step is not included in the Regulation. Indeed, the
only reference to dialogue is to be found in Article 6 of the Regulation which provides
the Parliament with the option to “invite the Commission for a structured dialogue on
its findings”. This new dialogue provided by the European Council is layered on top
of the dialogue that should occur between all Member States and the Commission
when the “guidelines” for using the Regulation are being prepared. In this section,
the EUCO Conclusions add yet another step that the Commission must take before
the Regulation can be used in a concrete case, a step that is not in the Regulation
itself as it only provides for the sending of a written notification of the Member State
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concerned, the obligation for the Member State concerned to provide all required
information and the option of make observations.
In point 2(h), the European Council inserts ominous language that requires the
Commission to “bear full responsibility” for the accuracy of its findings about a
Member State and indicates that measures undertaken against a Member States
under the Regulation shall be promptly reviewed with an aim toward removing them
upon request of the Member State involved. In both cases, the points drip with
suspicion that the Commission will not properly do its job because it will be tempted
to use biased information and/or will leave the measures in place for too long.
Point 2(j) seemingly aims to transform a mere recital of the Regulation into a
formal parallel process involving the European Council, an option that was firmly
rejected by the Parliament in the trialogue over the Regulation. The “emergency
brake” (also known as the “Orbán loop”) as originally proposed by the Council would
have permitted an affected Member State to move its case from the Council to the
European Council for review and decision, but this provision had been banished by
the Parliament in the trialogue process to a recital. Now an appeal to the European
Council is back in this part of the EUCO Conclusions. The European Council says
that it “will” put any such appeal on its agenda and “will strive to formulate a common
position” should it be seized exceptionally by a Member State that might be subject
to measures under this Regulation. The European Council has therefore turned a
recital into a parallel procedure, a last chance for a Member State to call off the dogs
of the Commission before they bite. But what Commission would proceed to cut
funds to a Member State if the “common position” of the European Council during
such a procedure was “we don’t think these measures are warranted” or “give the
Member State another chance”? By indicating its receptiveness to this evasion of
the Commission’s procedure, the EU Conclusions have undermined the role of the
Guardian of the Treaties in the whole process of adopting measures based on the
Regulation.
Lastly, point 2(k) repeats the final provision of the Regulation which provides for
its application as from 1 January 2021 with regard to both the new Multiannual
Financial Framework and the Next Generation EU fund as well as its entry into force
on the 12th day following the publication of the Regulation in the EU Official Journal.
However, as previously noted, point (c) instructed the Commission not to apply
the Regulation until after an ECJ judgment is issued and some guidelines are then
finalized by the Commission. This can only mean that the Regulation would enter
into force and then remain unapplied at the insistence of the European Council until
the conditions it has defined on its own motion are met. That is not normal.
In Section 3 of the EUCO Conclusions, the European Council “welcomes” a
Declaration to be adopted by the Commission “expressing its commitments” to go
along with all of the ways in which the EU Conclusions have changed the meaning
and operation of the Conditionality Regulation. Phrased to make it appear as if the
Commission has volunteered to be constructive, the provision has the ring of an offer
that the Commission could not refuse.
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Finally, the EUCO Conclusions end by exhorting the Parliament and Council to enact
the MFF, the Conditionality Regulation and Own Resources decision to finance
the Recovery Fund immediately, now that the EUCO has remade the whole deal
and which can yet however be undone by Hungarian and Polish governments
by blocking the ratification of the Own Resources decision or getting their fake
constitutional “courts” to find the Conditionality Regulation ultra vires whenever
convenient.
It has since emerged that the Council Legal Service has issued an opinion which
alleges that the EUCO Conclusions respect “the content and objectives of the
[rule of law] Regulation and is compatible with it. In particular, no element … is in
conflict with the Regulation, contradicts it or amends it” as the EUCO conclusions
would merely offer “clarifications, interpretative assurances”. It is submitted that this
assessment of the Council Legal Service is wrong. Several aspects of the EUCO
Conclusions breach EU law.
3. If the EUCO Conclusions breach EU Law, how can
the breach be remedied?
As Alberto Alemanno and Merijn Chamon have compellingly argued in the
Verfassungsblog and Aleksejs Dimitrovs in EU Law Live, the EUCO conclusions do
not comply with EU primary law, particularly the principle of institutional balance.
This is because a) the European Council gives instructions to the European
Commission, in breach of the Commission’s independence; b) the conclusions de
facto amend the Regulation without using the proper procedure, especially given
that the TEU prohibits the European Council to exercise legislative functions and
c) the Conclusions suspend the application of the regulation until the end of the
potential action for annulment brought by Hungary and Poland, which encroaches
directly upon the prerogatives of the Court of Justice while introducing an unlawful
presumption of illegality of the Regulation and inventing a new unlawful principle that
an annulment action can have a suspensory effect when the text of Article 278 states
literally the opposite!
Alemanno and Chamon also argue that an action for annulment against these
conclusions brought under Article 263 TFEU would be admissible since the text
clearly intends to create legal effects. We completely agree with their arguments,
and would only add a few more points about the way that actions could be brought
before the Court of Justice.
First, a potential action for annulment of the EUCO Conclusions could be
complemented by an application for suspension, in accordance with Article 160 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. A suspension, as an interim measure
while the case is considered, may be granted by the Court if three conditions are
met: 1) the action in the main proceedings must not appear, at first sight, to be
without reasonable substance; 2) the applicant must show that the measures are
urgent and that a serious and irreparable harm would occur without them and 3) the
interim measures must take account of the balancing of the parties’ interests and
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of the public interest. Given what we have already noted above, the first condition
is surely met. Moreover, the Court has already considered, notably in its interim
measures orders in the two cases Commission v Poland (see here and here), that
breaches of the rule of law can be serious and irreparable. If the operation of the
EUCO Conclusions allow breaches of the rule of law to continue, then a suspension
of these Conclusions would be warranted. Finally, since the suspension of the
Conclusions would only lead to the “normal” application of the Regulation from the
moment that it enters into effect, it could hardly be considered disproportionate
especially considering that a regulation is supposed to be “binding in its entirely
and directly applicable in all Member States” (Article 288 TFEU and see also Article
297(2) TFEU).
Second, an action for annulment could be combined with an action against the
Commission for failure to act, under Article 265 TFEU, should it refrain from
formulating the guidelines that are necessary for the implementation of the
regulation. This, however, would imply that such guidelines are legally required by
the Regulation – which is far from obvious since the text of the Regulation does
not explicitly call for them. In fact, the requirement that the Commission develop
such guidelines is one of the many reasons why the EUCO Conclusions may have
overstepped their proper role in the EU’s institutional balance. An action for failure to
act might instead be brought if the Commission in fact relied on the EU Conclusions
to wait before it enforced the Regulation when an occasion for doing so became
clear or if it failed to gather the information necessary for enforcing the Regulation.
Third, both judicial avenues would require a qualified party to bring the case before
the Court. This would be the main sticking point because the circle of those legally
empowered to do so is arguably limited. NGOs and individuals, in particular, are
likely to lack standing. The EUCO Conclusions could be considered a “regulatory
act” given its clear intent to have legal effect. According to Article 263 TFEU, it is
possible for legal and natural persons to bring an application for annulment against
a regulatory act even if they are not individually concerned, provided that it does
not entail implementing measures and is of direct concern to them. In its ruling in
the case Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 2013, the Court ruled that regulatory acts must be
understood as “acts of general application other than legislative acts”. According
to Article 289(3) TFEU, legislative acts are “legal acts adopted by legislative
procedure”, which is not the case for conclusions of the European Council. Since
the present conclusions cannot be said to have a determined addressee, they can
also be considered of “general application”, and thus qualify as “regulatory acts”.
Moreover, they do not seem to “entail implementing measures”. However, for a
natural or legal person to challenge such acts judicially, these acts must also be “of
direct concern to them”. It is settled case-law that this condition means that the act
must directly affect the legal position of the applicant. This condition would be hard to
satisfy concerning an application against the conclusions of the European Council.
That leaves the so-called “privileged applicants”, i.e. Member States, the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, which do not have to justify any
standing. The European Commission could clearly bring such an action, since it
is its prerogatives under the Conditionality Regulation that are the most affected.
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However, the Commission’s pledge to adopt a declaration expressing its intention
to abide by the Conclusions, referred to in the Conclusions themselves, makes such
a move extremely unlikely. A Member State could decide to bring an action, but
that would mean reneging on the approval that it gave to these Conclusions in the
European Council.
That leaves the European Parliament. At first, the reactions from the main political
groups made it seem unlikely that there would be any appetite to initiate a judicial
challenge. But with a couple of days to absorb the substantial changes in the
Conditionality Regulation that the EUCO Conclusions made, the Parliament seems
to be bestirring itself to act. As we write, we understand that the main parliamentary
groups are discussing a parallel declaration to the EUCO Conclusions laying out
Parliament’s own understanding of the Regulation. As a proper co-legislator, the
Parliament’s views should be more compelling than those of the European Council.
Could the Parliament not only pass a parallel declaration, but mount an action for
annulment against the EUCO Conclusions immediately as well as an action for
failure to act against the Commission if the Commission allows itself to be directed
by the EUCO Conclusions? It would require an extraordinary act of political will,
but throughout the Rule of Law crisis of the last decade, it has been the Parliament
that has always had the strongest commitment to basic European values. But if
the Parliament cannot rise to the occasion to challenge the EUCO Conclusions,
we might end up with a situation in which an illegal act of the European Council
is maintained for lack of any judicial challenge. Ironically, a text regarding the
protection of rule of law at national level might therefore reveal a rule of law flaw… at
EU level.
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